Abstract: Dictators often target opponents with nonviolent methods of repression, but we know little about whether and how these tactics reduce dissent. I focus on one such tool: employment repression, government efforts to prevent potential opponents from working. Drawing on the Argentine dictatorship’s artistic “black lists” – aimed at limiting the career opportunities of suspected communists between 1976 and 1983 – I use online movie database pages to compare the careers of those who were and were not barred from working. Results suggest that employment repression benefitted the regime by reducing the profile of potential dissenters; driving targeted artists overseas; isolating artists from their networks; and contributing to industry self-censorship more broadly. After democratization, blocklisted artists were more likely to work on projects about transitional justice, suggesting even nonviolent repression has long-term ramifications. Findings offer new evidence on the role and consequences of nonviolent repression in authoritarian regimes.