

Comments on
*Competition, Preference Uncertainty, and
Jamming*


Dan Butler



October 2013

	1-sided communication	2-sided communication
Affect on Voters	Druckman & others	Druckman & others
Elite Messaging	Lupia & McCubbins Econ. Lit.	

	1-sided communication	2-sided communication
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	Preferences Known	Preferences Uncertain
Voters		
Elites		





PLAYER A INSTRUCTIONS

Drag the WHITE tab to select a MESSAGE to send to Player C. When you are ready to send your message, click on the "Send Message" button.

If you have a question, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter.




PAYOFF FORMULA

$$\text{Payoff} = 100 - |\text{Target} - \text{Action}|$$

A player earns 100 points if the action is equal to his or her own target and 1 point less for each unit of difference between the action and the target.

PAYOFF CALCULATOR

Click on the buttons below to show or hide the payoff calculator.

 Possible values for C's target  Possible values for your target  Possible values for B's target

C's Target: -82 **Your Target: -101** **B's Target: Between -82 and -32**




Figure 1: *Screenshot from the Experiment*

Question and Future Projects

- ▶ What about signals outside receivers target region?
- ▶ Problems because floor/ceiling in signaling
- ▶ k-level & experiential learning - mutually exclusive?
- ▶ Future: Role of reputation